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Abstract The eBay Feedback Forum is claimed to be a crucial component of the success of eBay. Many 
empirical  studies  have found  that this  feedback  system  exerts  a  deterrent effect  on  the  opportunistic 
behavior the Internet's anonymity may incite buyers and sellers to adopt. The feedback system in place on 
eBay is however far from being perfect and may be especially vulnerable to strategic ratings (or non-
ratings) that might reduce the informational content of feedback profiles. This article aims to examine the 
efficiency  of  the  eBay  feedback  system,  through  a  set  of  experiments  based  on  the  trust  game.  Our 
experimental design consists of four different treatments. The baseline treatment corresponds to a finite 
repeated simultaneous trust game. The second treatment, called “eBay rating” is identical to the baseline 
treatment except that we added a second stage in which the players have the opportunity of rating their 
partner. In this treatment, each participant is given the choice to either evaluate immediately or wait, 
knowing that only one rating will be accepted. The third treatment, called "Sequential rating" is identical 
to the “eBay rating” treatment, except that the order in which players evaluate one another is randomly 
determined by the computer. Finally in the fourth treatment, called “Simultaneous rating”, both players 
are required to make their rating decisions simultaneously. Our experimental results indicate that the 
eBay feedback system could be improved by either constraining partners to leave ratings simultaneously 
or by predetermining the rating sequence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
"The majority of people are honest and mean well. […]. But you can unfortunately, on occasion, 
run into unscrupulous folks, […] Our approach is to eliminate them systematically in order to 
protect the honest ones, and your active participation is vital to this effort. Sign up with eBay and 
make  use  of  our  evaluation  procedure  to  leave  comments  on  other  members.  Feel  free  to 
compliment those members who are deserving and cite grievances when merited." 
Pierre Omidyar, eBay founder 
 
The online auction web site eBay, founded in 1995 by the computer programmer Pierre Omidyar, 
is a good example of the success of electronic marketplaces. In 2006, a total of 222 million users 
were  registered  on  eBay,  with  $52  billion-worth  of  transactions.  Millions  of  collectibles, 
appliances,  computers,  furniture,  equipment,  vehicles,  and  various  other  (even  rare  or  very 
valuable) items are sold daily on eBay.  
The success of such electronic marketplaces constitutes a challenge for economists. A number of 
the features of online markets, such as geographical distance and anonymity between buyers and 
sellers, make opportunistic behavior much easier than in traditional markets with “face-to-face” 
transactions. Sellers can be opportunistic by cheating on the quality of the product (for example 
by exaggerating its quality), or on delivery (e.g. not shipping, shipping items other than those 
described, shipping counterfeit merchandise or shipping slowly). Buyers can also be dishonest 
regarding the payment sent to the seller (for example by delaying payment).  
However electronic marketplaces can reduce opportunistic behaviors by screening participants 
and monitoring transactions. But such mechanisms can only be implemented in small online 
marketplaces (like business-to-business places), where the anonymity of partners is limited. On 
C2C (customer-to-customer) marketplaces like eBay or Amazon, the huge number of participants 
and daily transactions makes it difficult to centralize monitoring. An alternative method is to let 
partners  self-monitor  their  transactions  by  providing  them  a  decentralized  reputation-building 
mechanism.  The  eBay  Feedback  Forum,  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  crucial  component  of  the 
success of eBay, is a good example of such a decentralized mechanism. The idea is that the   3 
traders themselves are often in a better position to monitor and punish (or reward) their partners. 
In the eBay forum, both buyers and sellers have the opportunity of rating each other. They can 
send  a  "positive",  "negative",  or  "neutral"  rating  and  leave  a  comment.
1  Each  eBay  user  is 
therefore characterized by his or her feedback profile (i.e. the historical record of all the ratings 
they have received), which is available for consultation by all other users. The buyer and seller 
thus hold information on the reputation or reliability of their partner at the time of concluding the 
transaction. The Feedback Forum therefore plays both a punishment and a signaling role, since 
each trader can punish (reward) her partner by leaving negative (positive) ratings, but it also 
allows  each  trader  to  construct  a  publicly-observable  reputation.  The  threat  of  having  a  bad 
public reputation may provide the trader with sufficient incentives to be honest.  
Many empirical studies have found that this feedback system exerts a deterrent effect on 
the opportunistic behavior the Internet's anonymity may incite buyers and sellers to adopt. The 
empirical results show that a seller with good ratings can expect to sell an item more quickly and 
at a better price.
2 Houser and Wooders (2005) find that a 10% rise in the number of positive 
ratings recorded for a seller is associated with a 0.17% in the price that the seller can command, 
whereas a 10% rise in neutral or negative ratings lowers the price obtained by 0.24%. It is in the 
interest of both partners for their subsequent transactions to be as honest as possible in order to 
generate positive ratings, or at least avoid negative ratings, and so to improve or maintain their 
reputation. 
The feedback system in place on eBay is however far from being perfect and has proven 
especially vulnerable to strategic ratings (or non-ratings) that reduce the informational content of 
                                                 
1 In addition to leaving a overall feedback rating (positive, neutral, or negative) of the seller, buyers can also leave 
anonymous detailed seller ratings in four areas: item as described, communication, shipping time, and shipping and 
handling charges. The detailed seller rating system is based on a one- to five-star scale. Five stars is the highest 
rating, and one star is the lowest rating. Even if these detailed seller ratings do not affect the overall feedback score, 
they can provide additional information about the seller’s performance.  
2 Resnick et al. (2006) and Dellarocas (2006) provide summaries of this work.   4 
feedback  profiles  (Dellarocas  et  al.,  2006).
3  For  example,  a  buyer  or  seller  can  submit  an 
unjustified positive rating, to encourage the transaction partner to reciprocate with a positive 
rating. Analogously, a participant may elect not to enter a "justified" negative rating for fear of 
receiving  an  "unjustified"  negative  rating  in  return.  Dellarocas  et  al. (2006)  and  Klein  et 
al. (2005) provide empirical evidence of these phenomena of strategic reprisals and reciprocity at 
work on eBay, which ultimately serve to increase artificially the number of positive ratings and 
reduce negative ratings (see also Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). Dellarocas et al. (2006) suggest 
that  “the  most  efficient  way  to  curb  the  retaliation/reciprocation  problems  is  probably  one 
suggested recently, consisting simply in keeping the left  feedbacks secret until the period in 
which feedbacks can be given expires. Then agents cannot react anymore, and the feedbacks (if 
any) can be made public.” 
In this paper we experimentally investigate the extent to which eBay Feedback Forum could be 
improved  in  substituting  the  current  rating  rules  for  alternatives  that  limit  the  possibility  of 
strategic ratings: for example a rule requiring partners to evaluate simultaneously (i.e. to keep 
their ratings secret until the feedback period expires). More specifically, our analysis has three 
aims. First, we investigate the effects of  rating on trust and cooperation between traders, by 
comparing  marketplaces  with  and  without  feedback  systems.  Second,  we  try  to  understand 
sellers' and buyers' motives for rating their partners: I may wish to assign a negative (positive) 
rating to punish (reward) an unfair (fair) transaction with respect to payment, quality, delivery 
etc. (we call this Direct reciprocity); alternatively, I may want to assign a negative (positive) 
rating because I myself have received a negative (positive) rating (i.e. Indirect reciprocity); last, I 
may be willing to assign a positive rating because I expect that my partner will subsequently 
                                                 
3 Many complaints have been made about eBay's system of dealing with fraud. The complaints are generally that 
eBay sometimes fails to respond when a claim is made. Some complaints also concern eBay feedback. The eBay 
feedback system is used to combat fraud. However this system has a number of weaknesses, including the fact that 
small and large transactions carry the same weight in the feedback summary. It is therefore easy for a dishonest user 
to initially build up a deceptively positive rating by buying or selling a number of low-value items, such as e-books, 
recipes, etc., then subsequently switching to fraud.    5 
reciprocate  by  sending  me  a  positive  rating  (i.e.  Strategic  reason).  While  the  first  motive  is 
directly related to the transaction, this is not the case for the two last motives that might reduce 
the informational content of feedback profiles. Finally, the third aim of this paper is to investigate 
whether slight modifications of the current eBay feedback system could improve efficiency. In 
particular, does the introduction of feedback rules that reduce  rating that is not directly related to 
the transaction improve the informational content of ratings, and hence stimulate cooperation 
among partners? 
To answer these questions, we run an experiment inspired by the trust game devised by 
Berg et al. (1995), in which Player A (the buyer) selects the amount of allocation he wishes to 
send to Player B (the seller). Player B actually receives three times the amount sent and then must 
decide how much to return to the first player. This game yields a good approximation of how an 
eBay  transaction  might  be  conducted  inasmuch  as  eBay  practice  dictates  that  one  of  the 
commercial partners (the buyer) makes payment to the other (seller), in return for the promise of 
receiving the purchased item. The buyer is therefore required to trust the seller, who in turn can 
elect to be honest or, conversely, opportunistic by not delivering the item or by sending an item 
that does not correspond to that listed in the auction description.
4 In comparison to the standard 
trust game, we add a second step, once the investment decisions have been made, during which 
participants are given the option of evaluating their partners.
5  
Three feedback systems are tested. In the first, each player can opt to submit a rating 
either  immediately  or  at  a  subsequent  point  in time.  This  option  most closely  resembles  the 
system  currently  in  use  on  eBay  The  second  procedure  imposes  the  order  in  which  players 
evaluate  their  partners  (sequential  rating),  and  the  last  procedure  calls  for  players  to 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
4 The fact that both buyer and seller‘s decisions are not binary reflects the degree of trust.  Indeed for example the 
seller can be dishonest on the degree of quality of the item sent to the buyer or on the number of days for delivery.  
5 The first stage of this game is a drastic simplification of “real” transactions on eBay. Note however that in this 
study  we  mainly  focus  on  the  second  stage  (i.e.  evaluation  stage)  and  in  particular  the  relationship  between 
evaluation and trust that emerges from this first stage.    6 
simultaneously submit ratings (simultaneous ratings). The comparison between these different 
treatments should allow us to disentangle the different motives for rating partners. In particular, a 
simultaneous feedback system should limit both strategic ratings and indirect reciprocity, and 
thereby  enhance  informational  content  relative  to  the  current  system.  Simultaneous  ratings 
prevent players from adopting strategic behaviors, since they cannot assign a positive rating in 
order  to  trigger  a  positive  response  from  the  partner  (Dellarocas  et  al.,  2006).  Simultaneous 
decisions  also  reduce  indirect  reciprocity,  since  players  cannot  punish  (reward)  a  partner  for 
having received a negative (positive) rating. Finally, the feedback system with sequential rating 
should  provide  an  intermediate  solution  by  preventing  the  first  player  (only)  from  indirectly 
reciprocating and the second player (only) from adopting strategic behavior.  
Our analysis builds on previous experimental work. Our approach is related to Bolton et 
al. (2004), who ran an experiment using a two-stage game where buyers decide whether to send 
money and sellers then decide whether to ship the item. The authors compare a treatment with 
and without reputation. In the reputation condition, players were informed of each other’s past 
play. Bolton et al. (2003) find that trust and trustworthiness were significantly higher under a 
reputation system.
6 Our paper is also related to Keser (2003), the only previous paper, to our 
knowledge, to consider the effect of the eBay feedback system in the context of a trust-game 
experiment. Keser examined the effects of reputation by comparing three different treatments. In 
the baseline treatment, subjects play a repeated trust game under a stranger matching protocol.  
The reputation treatments (short- and long-term reputation) are similar to the baseline treatment, 
except that there is additional stage in which player A can rate player B by assigning her a 
costless positive, negative or neutral rating. At the beginning of each period player A will be 
therefore informed about player B's previous ratings. Keser finds that introducing this feedback 
system significantly increases cooperation in the trust game, in particular when subjects have full   7 
information  (long-run  reputation).  Our  experiment  builds  on  Keser  (2003),  with  the  notable 
exception that we allow both the buyer and the seller to rate their partners and we introduce a cost 
of evaluation. In addition, our experiment provides an in-depth analysis of the different motives 
for  rating  one's  partner,  and  provides  suggestions  for  the  amelioration  of  the  current  eBay 
feedback system. 
To anticipate our results, we find that trust is  significantly improved by  the use of a 
reputation feedback system. However, our results also indicate that trust runs deeper when the 
feedback system is more constrained than is eBay's current system. In particular we find that 
ratings are largely driven by indirect reciprocity (i.e. assigning a negative (positive) rating for 
having received a negative (positive) rating) and strategic motives (i.e. giving a positive rating 
while expecting the trading partner to reciprocate) in the eBay’s current system. Consistent with 
this, positive ratings are generally assigned immediately (the strategic reason) while negative 
feedback is given later because of the fear of retaliative negative feedback (a form of last minute 
feedback). eBay operations could thus be improved by modifying the rating rules at the end of 
each transaction. For example, a system in which individuals are not informed their partner's 
decision  before  taking  their  own  decision  provides  better  results  both  in  terms  of  trust  and 
earnings. 
The experimental protocol is presented in the next section. The experimental results are 
discussed in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
6  Bolton  et  al.  (2006)  also  run  experiments  investigating  how  the  interaction  between  market  competition  and 
reputation  creates  trust  between  sellers  and  buyers.  See  also  Gazzale  and  Khopkar  (2007)  that  use  the  same 
experimental design, but introduce the possibility for sellers to observe buyer’s past feedback provision.    8 
2. Experimental design 
2.1. Overview  
Our  experimental  design  consists  of  four  different  treatments.  The  baseline  treatment 
corresponds to a finite repeated simultaneous trust game. The game lasts for 20 periods. At the 
beginning of each period, participants A and B each receive a 10-unit allocation. Player A (the 
buyer) selects an amount between 0 and 10 units to send to B (the seller), while at the same time 
B determines the sum to be returned, which is between 0 and the amount received (which latter is 
the amount sent by A multiplied by three).
7 Player A's gain is then equal to 10 – amount sent + 
amount returned, and Player B's gain is 10 + 3*amount received – amount returned.  
The second treatment, called “eBay rating”, is identical to the baseline treatment except 
that we added a second stage in which the players have the opportunity of rating their partner. 
Both players (A and B) can decide to rate their partner by assigning either a negative (-1) or 
positive (+1) point. However, leaving a rating costs 1 unit (i.e. 1/10th of the initial allocation).
8 
The rated player does not incur any direct cost or benefit, although the negative or positive points 
received are recorded on the player's feedback profile. This profile contains a historical record of 
all ratings, along with a score that represents the cumulative sum of positive and/or negative 
points  obtained  over  all  of  the  previous  periods.  At  each  new  period,  the  player's  profile  is 
transmitted to their subsequent partner, so that each player is aware of their partner's ratings and 
has an idea of his partner's reputation. In the “eBay rating” treatment, the rating rules correspond 
quite  close  to  those  currently  practiced  on  eBay,  which  leave  buyers  and  sellers  with  a  fair 
amount of flexibility to rate one another in the 90 days following the transaction: they can either 
rate immediately or wait until the rating period has almost elapsed before sending their ratings 
                                                 
7 This is a cold procedure, where A and B play simultaneously. Player A chooses the amount to send B, while B 
determines the amount to return for all potential amounts received from A. The advantage of this cold procedure is 
that it places the two players in a more symmetrical position than a so-called hot procedure (whereby A chooses first, 
and subsequently B), which could provide Players A and B with justified (i.e. non-strategic) reasons to evaluate their 
partner positively or negatively.   9 
points. In this treatment, each participant is given the choice to either evaluate immediately or 
wait, knowing that only one rating will be accepted. This option is reflected in the experimental 
protocol  by  splitting  the  rating  stage  into  two  phases:  each  player  has  the  possibility  of 
proceeding with the rating straight away in Phase 1 or waiting until Phase 2. If the participant 
waits  until  Phase  2,  he  is  made  aware  of  his  partner's  choice  (i.e.  either  an  immediate 
positive/negative  rating,  or  no  rating),  prior  to  ultimately  deciding  whether  to  evaluate  his 
partner. With this system, players can implement various types of strategies. They can opt to 
submit  a  positive  rating  immediately  in  order  to  incite  a  positive  rating  in  return  (strategic 
motive), provided the partner has decided to wait or, on the other hand, to wait so as to punish 
any partner who gives a negative rating in Phase 1 (indirect reciprocity).
9  
The third treatment, called "Sequential rating" is identical to the “eBay rating” treatment 
described above, except that the order in which players evaluate one another (i.e. rating in phase 
1  or  in  phase  2)  is  exogenously  predetermined  by  a  computer  in  each  period.  This  variant 
constrains partners' rating freedom along with their possibility of adopting strategic behavior. For 
the player who is designated to rate first (i.e. in phase 1), the motivations are narrowed to indirect 
positive reciprocity, while the player in the second position only has negative indirect reciprocity 
(i.e. reprisal) as a potential strategic incentive. 
The  last  treatment,  called  “Simultaneous  rating”,  is  even  more  restrictive,  since  both 
players are required to make their rating decisions simultaneously. In the eBay context, this rule 
would correspond to keeping buyer and seller ratings secret until the rating period has expired; 
this system would, in theory, eliminate both strategic ratings and indirect reciprocity (Dellarocas 
et al. (2006)). 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 On eBay, this cost does not take the form of a direct monetary expense, but rather an opportunity cost related to the 
amount of time or effort devoted to this task. 
9 The waiting preference on the part of a player wishing to send a negative rating to an opportunistic partner can also 
be strategic, i.e. in order to avoid reprisals (in the form of a negative rating) from the punished partner.   10 
These experimental treatments enable us to compare the performance and level of trust 
generated by different rating policies. Does the introduction of feedback rules reducing strategic 
rating incentives improve the informational content of ratings and hence stimulate cooperation 
among partners? Before presenting our results, we briefly present the theoretical predictions of 
our experimental games. Since players deal with different partners each period, it can be proved 
by backward induction that in the second stage, neither player should rate their partner, inasmuch 
as rating is expensive (regardless of the feedback system). In the absence of rating, the game 
reduces to a standard trust game with a trivial subgame perfect equilibrium: since the second 
player will always benefit by keeping everything, the first player therefore never sends anything 
and, in the end, each partner's gain equals their initial endowment. This situation is collectively 
suboptimal because by sending part of his endowment, the first player could have increased the 
gains  of  both  players;  gains  would  be  maximized  were  the  first  player  to  send  his  entire 
endowment. 
 
2.2. Procedure and parameters 
The experiment consists of 25 sessions, with 10 participants in each session.
10 There were at 
least six sessions, and thus independent observations, for each treatment. Seven sessions were 
conducted under the baseline and Simultaneous rating treatments, and six for both the sequential 
and the eBay rating treatments, giving a total of 252 participants. All of the sessions were held at 
the Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University Rennes I, Rennes, 
France. The experiment was computerized using the Ztree program developed at the University 
of Zurich.
11 The subjects were undergraduate students from a variety of majors. Roughly one-
third were Economics students in the first two years of their University studies, and all but a 
                                                 
10 With the exception of two sessions of the baseline treatment and one session of the SEQUENTIAL treatment 
which contained eight players.    11 
small number of the remaining two-thirds  were students in law, management, and medicine. 
None  of  the  subjects  had  participated  in  an  economic  experiment  previously.  No  individual 
participated in more than one session. On average, a session lasted 100 minutes, including initial 
instructions and subject payment. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  the  instructions  were  distributed  and  read  to  the 
subjects.
12 All subjects were then required to answer a number of questions concerning the rules 
of the game and how earnings are determined. The experimenter then announced and explained 
the correct answers. Subjects could indicate whether they had any questions about the process 
and the experimenter would answer them in private.  
Each session had twenty interaction periods. Each period within a session proceeded under 
identical rules. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant was assigned the role of 
player A or player B.  They kept this role during the entire session. The computer network then 
matched  the  subjects  into  pairs  of  players,  with  one  player  A  and  one  player  B.  A  stranger 
matching protocol was used in all of the sessions: at the end of each period, the composition of 
the groups changed so that individuals were rematched with another partner on a random basis. 
Average player remuneration was 18 euros. 
Table 1 presents a summary description of the sessions. The two first columns show the 
session  number  and  the  number  of  subjects  who  took  part  in  the  session.  The  third  column 
indicates the treatment. 
[Table 1 : about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 See Fischbacher (1999) for a description of the Ztree computer program. 
12 Game instructions are available upon request from the authors.   12 
3. Experimental results 
This section is organised as follows. Subsection 3.1 discusses the patterns of players’ 
investments in the trust game and considers the impact of rating on the first-stage decisions. 
Subsection  3.2  analyses  the  determinants  of  rating  in  each  rating  system.  In  particular,  we 
examine the extent to which the current eBay feedback system could be improved. 
  
 
3.1. Trust and trustworthiness with and without feedback systems 
 
Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of the investments of players A and B 
in each treatment.  
[Table 2 : about here] 
 
 
Player A's average investment is the highest in the simultaneous treatment (4.36), followed 
by the Sequential (4.17), eBay (3.00) and Baseline (2.24) treatments, but there is considerable 
heterogeneity between groups in all of the treatments. A Mann-Whitney pairwise test comparing 
investment between treatments, under the assumption that each session is a unit of observation, 
reveals greater investment in the treatments with reputation (Sequential and Simultaneous) than 
in the Baseline treatment (two-tailed tests: z=-2.714 with p<0.01; and z=-2.747 with p<0.01). 
However the difference between the Baseline and the eBay treatments is not significant (two-
tailed test: z=-1.14 with p>0.1), although we do observe higher levels of investment in the eBay 
treatment. These results indicate that introducing a feedback system significantly increases trust 
and trustworthiness between partners. However, it appears that the type of feedback rule matters, 
and that the most sophisticated system (like the eBay rating system) is not necessary the most 
efficient. Investment is actually significantly higher in the Simultaneous rating system compared   13 
to the eBay rating treatment (two-tailed test: z = 1.715 with p<0.1).
13  Figure 1 illustrates these 
differences in the investment by player A. 
[Figure1 : about here] 
 
Figure 1 displays average investment by A-players per period for each treatment. The investment 
level is higher under treatments with rating. Further, average investment in the Simultaneous 
treatment is higher than in the eBay treatment for all the periods (except period 19). Investment 
decreases  over  time.  When  we  decompose  the  periods  into  quarters,  and  compare  average 
investment in periods 1-5 and 16-20, we find that average investment falls significantly in all 
treatments.  This  decrease  is  statistically  significant  in  the  baseline  (Wilcoxon  test:  z  =2.366, 
p<0.05). The same test also indicates significant declines in the eBay treatment (z=1.99, p<0.05) 
and the simultaneous treatment  (z =2.366, p<0.05). Finally, the decline is not significant in the 
sequential treatment (z =0.524, p>0.1). 
[Figure 2 : about here] 
Figure 2 indicates the frequencies of each investment level. We can see that player A sent 0 units 
in about 45% of the cases in the baseline treatment. This frequency is significantly lower for the 
treatments  with  ratings,  in  particular  in  the  Sequential  (25.5%)  and  Simultaneous  (26%) 
treatments.  In  contrast,  the  frequency  of  choosing  high  investments  is  higher  for  feedback 
treatments than for the baseline treatment. For example, the frequency of choosing 10 units is 
14.7% in the Simultaneous treatment and only 5% in the baseline treatment.   
Turning next to the return of player B, Figure 3 shows player B’s investment for each level of 
player A’s investment. For all treatments, the level of player  B’s investment is strongly  and 
positively correlated with player A's investment.   
[Figure 3 : about here] 
                                                 
13 The differences between eBay and Sequential, and between Sequential and Simultaneous, are 
not significant.   14 
 
 
Table 2 above shows the average investments by player B and the average relative amounts 
returned in each treatment. B-players invest significantly more under reputation treatments than 
in the baseline treatment. They return an average of 4.21 (Simultaneous treatment) and 3.98 units 
(sequential treatment), which is significantly higher than the 1.45 units in the baseline treatment  
(z=-2.875  with  p<0.01,  and  z=-2.429  with  p<0.05,  respectively  for  the  simultaneous  and 
sequential  treatments).  However  the  average  return  in  the  eBay  treatment  (2.8  units)  is  not 
significantly  different  from  that  obtained  in  the  baseline  treatment  (z=-1.571  with  p>0.1). 
Comparing  the  different  rating  systems,  we  note  that  the  average  investment  level  in  the 
Simultaneous treatment is significantly greater than in the eBay treatment (z=1.64 with p<0.1).  
The other differences between rating systems are not statistically significant.  
Figure 4 shows player B’s average return over time for each treatment. This confirms that Player 
B’s average investment is higher under treatments with a feedback system, and in particular 
under the Simultaneous treatment compared to the baseline treatment. It also shows that average 
return falls over time in all treatments.  Comparing periods 1-5 and 16-20, this fall is significant 
in all treatments (p=0.0180, p=0.0464, p=0.0747 and p=0.0280 for the baseline, eBay, sequential 
and simultaneous treatments, respectively). 
[Figure 4 : about here] 
To sum up, the results of our experiments are all consistent with the hypothesis that introducing a 
feedback  system  improves  cooperation,  in  particular  when  the  rating  system  prevents  the 
adoption of strategic behavior.  
 
 
3.2 Measuring the efficiency of the different rating systems 
 
To compare the impact of the three feedback systems on the amounts sent by players, we 
estimate a GLS panel model with random effects. The determinants of the amounts invested and   15 
returned by players in period t are: the amount received in period t-1 from the previous partner, 
and  a  set  of  variables  describing  the  current  partner's  profile.  The  "positive  rating  in  t-1" 
("negative  rating  in  t-1")  variable  indicates  whether  or  not  the  partner  received  a  positive 
(negative) rating in the previous period. These variables are interpreted in comparison with the 
omitted variable “No rating in previous periods”. The cumulative positive rating variable takes the 
value of 1 if the cumulative sum of ratings since the beginning of the game is positive and 0 
otherwise. The cumulative negative rating variable is constructed symmetrically.  
The impact of feedback systems on player investments is measured by means of a dummy 
variable for each rating system (Simultaneous, Sequential, eBay). We also introduced a trend 
variable (period) as well as an indicator variable for the final period (period_20). Table 3 shows 
the results of the estimation of the GLS model.  
[Table 3 : about here] 
The  amounts  sent  depend  on  the  amount  received  during  the  previous  period. 
Consequently, Player A is more strongly inclined to trust player B (i.e. to send him a higher share 
of his endowment) were he to have received a greater sum from his previous partner. Similarly, 
Player  B  returns  more  as  the  amount  received  previously  by  his  partner  rises.  The  negative 
coefficient on the "period" variable (trend) also shows that the investment level drops over time, 
even with the introduction of a feedback system. Furthermore, the amount sent is tied to the 
partner's feedback profile (i.e. his past ratings). The results show that players take into account 
the full history of past ratings and do not only focus on the most recent rating. Player A will 
therefore  increase  investment  if  the  number  of  positive  ratings  received  from  prior  partners 
exceeds  the  number  of  negative  ratings.  The  marginal  effects  suggest  that  participants  place 
greater emphasis on positive than on negative ratings in determining how much to send to their 
partner.   16 
We also find that changing the current eBay rating policy in favor of more restrictive rules 
(ratings submitted in a predetermined order or simultaneous ratings) leads to greater trust and 
trustworthiness. 
 
3.3. Motivations for rating one's partner and limitations of the current system 
In this section, we consider the motivations for rating one's partner. In the context of a trust 
game, the motivation of ratings may be complex, depending on both emotional reactions to the 
amount  received  from  the  partner  (direct  reciprocity),  reactions  to  received  ratings  (indirect 
reciprocity)  and  anticipated  reactions  to  ratings  (strategic  reasons).  Since  the  Sequential  and 
Simultaneous  systems  aim  to  reduce  both  strategic  manipulation  and  indirect  reciprocity,  we 
should see lower rating levels in the Sequential and Simultaneous treatments compared to the 
current eBay system.  
 Comparing the individual rating patterns in the three systems yields some interesting and 
intuitive results. Figure 5 illustrates the relative frequencies of overall ratings (both positive and 
negative rating) in all the rating treatments.
14 This shows that as the game is repeated, the number 
of ratings tends to fall over time. Furthermore, consistent with our conjecture, Figure 5 shows 
that  the  average  rating  is  higher  under  the  eBay  treatment  than  under  the  Sequential  and 
Simultaneous treatments.   
[Figure 5 : about here] 
 
This result is also supported by Table 4. which shows that the frequency of rating is lower 
for the simultaneous (20%) and the sequential (23%) treatments compared to the eBay  treatment 
(27%). The frequency of overall rating in the eBay treatment is significantly higher than in the 
                                                 
14 Similar results were obtained when we distinguished between positive and negative ratings.   17 
Simultaneous treatment (z=2.017, p=0.0437). The differences between Sequential and eBay, and 
between Sequential and Simultaneous, are not significant.  
[Table 4 : about here] 
 
Table 5 provides further information about the determinants of rating in each treatment. 
First, it indicates that both buyers and sellers evaluate their partners. However, it appears that A-
players generally assign more negative ratings while B-players assign more positive ratings.
15 
Second,  consistent  with  direct  reciprocity  motivations,  ratings  are  strongly  correlated  with 
investment levels. Table 5 shows that traders assign negative ratings for low investment levels. In 
contrast positive ratings are more likely to be assigned to high investment levels. Third, Table 5 
also indicates that most of the negative ratings are assigned in phase 2 of the eBay and Sequential 
treatments while positive ratings are generally given in the first stage. This result indicates that 
traders assign negative ratings in the second phase to escape retaliation (a last minute feedback 
strategy)  while  evaluating  positively  in  first  phase  may  incite  the  partner  to  reciprocate  by 
evaluating positively.  
[Table 5 : about here] 
 
In  order  to  provide  more  formal  evidence  of  the  informational  bias  and  inefficiency 
contained in the current eBay feedback system, we estimate a probit in Table 4 for the probability 
of negatively rating one's partner within the eBay treatment using a selection-bias correction.
16 
We  explain  rating  motivations  by  the  following  explanatory  variables:  the  amount  sent  or 
returned by the partner and a dummy variable for whether the participant decided to rate during 
                                                 
15  A  potential  explanation  of  this  difference  is  that  B-players  have  two  ways  of  negatively  reciprocating:  by 
assigning negative ratings and by returning lower levels of investment.   
 
16 As the probability of submitting a negative (positive) rating actually depends upon the probability of submitting an 
rating. We considered two separable decisions using a two-step estimation procedure : first the decision to evaluate 
someone and second, conditional on the decision to evaluate, the choice of assigning a negative evaluation. We first 
estimate the evaluation probability using a random-effects Probit model; we then explain the negative evaluation 
decision, conditional on the decision to evaluate corrected for a potential selection bias via the inverse of the Mills   18 
Phase 1. We also consider interactions for whether the rating posted by the partner is positive (or 
negative) and whether this information was known at the time his own rating was posted. These 
latter  variables  enable  us  to  identify  the  presence  of  strategic  rating  motivations  based  on 
reciprocity (either positive or negative). 
[Table 6 : about here] 
 
Table 6 shows that the probability of negatively (positively) rating one's partner decreases 
(increases)  with  the  amount  received.  Moreover,  the  negative  and  significant  coefficient  on  
"Rating during Phase 1" shows that rating immediately reduces the probability of a negative 
rating. This reveals the presence of strategic rating, with players posting a positive rating as 
quickly as possible, to incite their partner to rate them positively in return. This also means that 
players who want to rate their partner negatively tend to wait for the second phase (if possible) to 
avoid reprisals. Furthermore, the positive and highly significant coefficient on the interaction 
"Received a negative rating AND knows this result" means that players use negative ratings as a 
means of reprisal against partners who assign them a negative rating.  
These  results  support  our  conjecture  that  eBay’s  current  feedback  system  produces 
informational  bias  and  can  be  improved  by  reducing  strategic  rating  motivations  (i.e.  by 
constraining the partners to rate each other simultaneously). All of these results are consistent 
with Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) and Dellarocas et al. (2004), who found reciprocity and 
retaliation in eBay ratings. Such behavior could explain the overrepresentation of positive rating 
in eBay users’ profiles.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
ratio (the "IMR" variable). The estimation results of the probit selection are not presented here (available upon   19 
3.4. Welfare levels 
 
Table 7 shows the profits of players A and B in each treatment. In all treatments, player B’s 
profits are significantly higher than player A's (Wilcoxon tests, p<0.005). Profit dispersion is also 
higher for B-players than for A-players. This result is confirmed in Figure 6, which displays 
average profit over time in each treatment.   
[Table 7 and Figure 6: about here] 
 
 
  Player A’s profit is on average 9.21 in the baseline treatment compared to 9.44, 9.57 and 
9.62 in the eBay, Sequential and Simultaneous treatments, respectively. The difference in total 
earnings between the baseline treatment and the Simultaneous treatment is significant at the p < 
0.1 level, according to a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test. However, the two other treatments with 
rating systems do not generate significantly higher earnings than the Baseline treatment.   
  Player B’s average profit also increases from 15.27 in the baseline treatment to 16.01, 
18.3 and 18.65 in the eBay, Sequential and Simultaneous treatments. The differences between the 
baseline and the Simultaneous treatment as well as the Sequential treatment are significant (z=-
2.492 with p=0.012, and z=-2.429 with p=0.0127, respectively). However, the difference between 
the baseline treatment and the eBay treatment is not significant (z=-0.429, p=0.668). These results 
indicate  that  the  introduction  of  feedback  systems  is  welfare-improving,  if  reciprocation  and 
relatiation are ruled out. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
  This experimental study has provided several insights into the impact of feedback systems  
on  trust  and  trustworthiness  in  electronic  marketplaces.  First  and  foremost,  it  has  shown the 
benefit of rating systems like those introduced on eBay. The results establish that participants 
                                                                                                                                                              
request).   20 
(whether buyers or sellers) rely upon their partner's profile when making decisions. This effective 
use of information provided by feedback profiles, as empirically observed on eBay, is identified 
in a controlled experimental setting. The second key finding is that the design of rating policy 
influences  both  the  level  of  trust  and  efficiency  of  a  eBay-  like  marketplace.  From  this 
perspective,  implementing  more  flexible  feedback  mechanisms  can  erode  the  trust  between 
partners, by generating excessive negative or positive rating reciprocities. In contrast, a system in 
which  ratings  are  kept  secret  serves  to  limit  strategic  ratings  and  proves  more  effective  in 
enhancing trust. 
This study has thus paved the way to the examination of the appropriate design of virtual 
communities and electronic marketplaces. It also confirms the interest electronic marketplace 
managers  have  in  performing  laboratory  experiments  prior  to  implementing  or  changing  the 
design of their platforms (for example eBay’s rules and policies).   21 
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Tables 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sessions 
 
Treatment    Treatment  Session 
Number 
Number of 
Subjects     
Session 
Number 
Number of 
Subjects   
1  10  Baseline    14  10  Sequential 
2  10  Baseline    15  10  Sequential 
3  8  Baseline    16  10  Sequential 
4  8  Baseline    17  8  Sequential 
5  10  Baseline    18  10  Sequential 
6  8  Baseline    19  10  Sequential 
7  10  Baseline    20  10  Simultaneous 
8  10  eBay    21  10  Simultaneous 
9  10  eBay    22  10  Simultaneous 
10  10  eBay    23  10  Simultaneous 
11  10  eBay    24  10  Simultaneous 
12  10  eBay    25  10  Simultaneous 
13  10  eBay    25  10  Simultaneous 
        Total   252 subjects 
 
 
Table 2. Player A's investment and Player B's return  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Baseline  eBay  Sequential   Simultaneous 
Player A's investment  2.24 
(2.91) 
3.02 
(3.09) 
4.17 
(3.50) 
4.36 
(3.70) 
Player B's investment  1.45 
(3.16) 
2.8 
( 4.67) 
3.98 
(5.35) 
4.21 
(6.32) 
Relative return for player A in  %  11.8%  19.1%  22.4%  22.8% 
Observations  1280  1200  1160  1400   23 
Table 3: Determinants of the amounts invested by participants (GLS panel model 
with random effects)
17 
  All treatments  All treatments  Treatments with rating 
 
Variable 
Amount sent by 
Player A in period 
t (1) 
Amount sent by 
Player B in period t 
(2) 
Amount sent by 
Player A in period 
t (3) 
Amount sent by 
Player B in period 
(4) 
Amount received in  t-1  1.912***  1.645***  1.657***  0173***
  (0.231)  (0.030)  (0.255)  (0.037)
    0.496***  0.486*** Cumulative positive ratings 
(partner's profile)      (0.066)  (0.093)
    -0.335***  -0.373*** Cumulative negative ratings 
(partner's profile)      (0.052)  (0.124)
    0.068  0.215 Positive rating in t-1 
(partner's profile)      (0.274)  (0.394)
    -0.135  -0.144 Negative rating in t-1 
(partner's profile)      (0.185)  (0.446)
eBay rating     0.673**      1.148***  Ref.  Ref. 
  (0.366)  (0.290)     
Sequential rating  1.740***  2.154***  0.961**  0.913***
  (0.370)  (0.297)  (0.388)  (0.323)
Simultaneous rating  1.923***  2.360***  1.116***  1.57***
  (0.353)  (0.285)  (0.371)  (0.312)
Period  -0.107***       -0.113***  -0.082***  -0.152***
  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.034)
Period_20  0.179  -0.737  -0.103  -0.918
  (0.266)  (0.491)  (0.310)  (0.613)
Constant  3.113***  2.323***  3.938***  3.409***
  (0.284)  (0.312)  (0.319)  (0.402)
Observations  2394  2394  1786  1786
R
2  0.16  0.08  0.17  0.08 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and 
* at the 10% level. 
                                                 
17 Our results are robust with respect to other estimation techniques like ordered probit, fixed effect models, and OLS 
regressions that do not include random effects.     24 
Table 4. Frequencies of rating per treatment   
Treatments  Sessions  Frequencies  of 
ratings 
Frequencies  of 
positive ratings 
Frequencies  of 
negative ratings 
1  0.155  0.03  0.125 
2  0.285  0.045  0.24 
3  0.395  0.185  0.21 
4  0.24  0.19  0.05 
5  0.275  0.12  0.155 
 
 
eBay treatment 
6  0.285  0.145  0.14 
Average  0.27  0.12  0.15 
7  0.31  0.095  0.215 
8  0.235  0.16  0.075 
9  0.225  0.05  0.175 
10  0.225  0.13  0.095 
11  0.255  0.15  0.105 
 
 
Sequential treat. 
12  0.155  0.06  0.095 
Average  0.23  0.10  0.13 
  13  0.19  0.07  0.12 
14  0.225  0.065  0.16 
15  0.175  0.055  0.12 
16  0.21  0.07  0.14 
19  0.225  0.1  0.125 
20  0.225  0.13  0.095 
 
 
Simultaneous 
treatment 
21  0.175  0.07  0.105 
Average  0.20  0.08  0.12 
 
 
Table 5 . Ratings per treatment depend on average investment and returns. 
 
 
Treat.  Rating  Rating of player A  Player 
B’s 
invest. 
Rating of player B  Player 
A’s 
invest. 
    All  Seq rating    All  Seq rating 
 
 
      Phase 1  Phase 2      Phase 1  Phase 2   
No rating   77.71%      3.64  78.71%      4,23 
Negative rating   16%      2.8  11.57%      1,71 
Simultaneous 
Positive rating   6.29%      14.81  9.71%      8,53 
No rating   75.34%      3.42  77.76%      3,69 
Negative rating   17.59%  20.55%  50%  3.14  7.41%  70.27%  72.46%  2,25 
Sequential 
Positive rating   7.07%  79.45%  50%  12.14  14.83%  29.23%  27.54%  7,60 
No rating   72.83%      2.49  72.67%      2,89 
Negative rating   20.17%  30.51%  58.70%  1.98  10.50%  61.54%  90.28%  1,5 
eBay 
Positive rating   7%  69.49%  41.30%  11.23  16.83%  38.46%  9.72%  6,33   25 
Table 6: The determinants of ratings (Probit with random effects for the 
probability of negative rating) 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and 
* at the 10% level. 
Table 7. Players’ profits 
 
 
 
 
Variable  (1)  
A's rating of B 
(2) 
B's rating  
of A 
Amount received  -0.241***  -0.430*** 
  (0.043)  (0.067) 
Rating during Phase 1  -1.574***  -0.785** 
  (0.471)  (0.328) 
0.004  -0.358  Received a positive rating AND 
knows this result  (0.428)  (0.649) 
1.785**  0.812**  Received a negative rating AND 
knows this result  (0.827)  (0.403) 
Constant  3.810***  2.607** 
  (0.789)  (1.070) 
Observations  149  153 
Log-likelihood  -32.27  -49.52 
  Baseline  eBay  Sequential  Simultaneous 
Player A's profit  9.21 
(2.66) 
9.44 
(3.66) 
9.57 
(3.99) 
9.62 
(5.10) 
Player B's profit  15.27 
   (7.22) 
16.01 
 ( 7.21) 
18.3 
(7.91) 
18.65 
(8.94) 
Observations  1280  1200  1160  1400   26 
Figures 
Figure 1: Player A’s average investment in Each Treatment,  
by Period 
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Baseline  Simultaneous Sequential eBay  27 
Figure 2: Distribution of investment levels for player A 
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Baseline Simultaneous Sequential eBay    28 
Figure 3. Player B’s return for each player A’s investment level 
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Baseline Simulatenous Sequential eBay    29 
Figure 4: Player B’s Average return in each treatment, by period 
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Baseline  Simultaneous Sequential eBay  
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Figure 5. Average rating over time 
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Figure 6. Average payoff over time 
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